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Abstract
Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky are considered to be the most influential linguists. In 
this paper, we contrast their accounts concerning the following issues of language and try to make 
clear differences between them, mainly referring to Saussure’s langue and Chomsky’s I-language: 
1) How concepts emerge, 2) How phonemes appear, 3) How languages change, 4) Where syntax 
belongs to, 5) Whether language is social or biological, 6) What parts of speech are, and 7) Whether 
languages are delimited or not. By doing so, it will be understood that in what ways the two linguists 
have common or different ideas about language.
Keywords: langue, parole, I-language, E-language, concept, phoneme, changes of language, 
syntax, social fact, biology, parts of speech, delimitation of languages.
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Resumen
Ferdinand de Saussure y Noam Chomsky son considerados los lingüistas más influyentes en el 
área. En este trabajo, contrastamos sus relatos sobre las siguientes cuestiones del lenguaje y tratamos 
de hacer claras diferencias entre ellas, haciendo referencia principalmente a la lengua de Saussure 
y a la lengua-I de Chomsky: 1) cómo surgen los conceptos, 2) cómo aparecen los fonemas, 3) cómo 
cambian las lenguas  4) a dónde pertenece la sintaxis, 5) si el lenguaje es social o biológico, 6) cuáles 
son las partes del discurso, y 7) si las lenguas están delimitadas o no. Al hacerlo, se comprenderá que 
de qué maneras los dos lingüistas tienen ideas comunes o diferentes sobre el lenguaje.
Palabras clave: lengua, parole (habla), lengua-I, lengua-E, concepto, fonema, cambios del lenguaje, 
sintaxis, hechos sociales, biología, partes del discurso, delimitación de las lenguas.
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Introduction
In the history of linguistics, Saussure and 
Chomsky have had a great influence on 
methodology of linguistics. What have they 
thought of language and how have they treated 
with language? Are their research methods 
or views of language the same as or different 
from each other? Even though their views are 
different, can we reconcile them? Or after all, 
do their views lead to the same conclusion? 
To answer these questions above, we will 
consider the two linguists' thoughts concerning 
languages: 1) How concepts emerge, 2) How 
phonemes appear, 3) How languages change, 4) 
Where syntax belongs to, 5) Whether language is 
social or biological, 6) What parts of speech are, 
and 7) Whether languages are delimited or not. 
 
1. How do concepts emerge?
1.1. Concepts emerge after a langue divides the 
masses of concept and sound
According to Saussure, it is after a langue 
(language) divides both the mass of concept and 
the mass of sound at the same time that signes 
(words) begin to exist. This means that we have 
nothing dis¬tinct both in the mass of concept 
and in the mass of sound in advance of a langue:
Psychologically, what are our ideas, apart 
from our language [langue]? They probably do 
not exist. Or in a form that may be described 
as amorphous. We should probably be unable, 
according to philosophers and linguists, to 
distinguish two ideas clearly without the 
help of a language [langue] (internal language 
[langue] naturally). Consequently, in itself, 
the purely conceptual mass of our ideas, the 
mass separated from the language [langue], is 
like a kind of shapeless nebula, in which it is 
impossible to distinguish anything initially. The 
same goes, then, for the language [langue]: the 
different ideas represent nothing pre-existing. 
There are no: a) ideas already established and 
quite distinct from one another, b) signs for 
these ideas. But there is nothing at all distinct 
in thought before the linguistic sign. This is the 
main thing. On the other hand, it is also worth 
asking if, beside this entirely indistinct realm 
of ideas, the realm of sound offers in advance 
quite distinct ideas (taken in itself apart from the 
idea). There are no distinct units of sound either, 
delimited in advance. [...] It would above all be 
necessary that the signified element should be 
something determined in advance, and it is not. 
(Saussure 1993: 137a-139a)
Does anything like "pure concepts" or "pure 
phonemes" exist before signes come into being? 
If "pure concepts" existed before signes emerge, 
what would happen? As proof of this, Saussure 
insists that his view can be verified in vocabulary, 
tense, and aspect:
If ideas were predetermined in the human 
mind before being linguistic values, one thing 
that would necessarily happen is that terms 
would correspond exactly as between one 
language [langue] and another.
French  German
cher [ `dear' ] lieb, teuer (also moral)
There is no exact correspondence.
juger, estimer urteilen, erachten
[ `judge, estimate' ] have a set of meanings  
   only partly coinciding  
   with French juger, estimer
We see that in advance of the language 
[langue] there is nothing which is the notion 
'cher' in itself. [...] Idea of different tenses, which 
seems quite natural to us, is quite alien to certain 
languages. As in the Semitic system (Hebrew) 
there is no distinction, as between present, 
future and past; that is to say these ideas of 
tense are not predetermined, but exist only as 
values in one language [langue] or another. Old 
German has no future, no proper form for the 
future. It expresses it by means of the present. 
But this is a matter of speaking. Hence Old 
German present value is not the same as in 
French future. Similarly if we take the difference 
between the perfective aspect of the verb and 
the imperfective aspect in the Slavic languages 
(difficulty in the study of these languages). In 
Slavic languages, constant distinction between 
aspects of the verb: action outside any question 
of time or in process of accomplishment. We find 
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these distinctions difficult because the categories 
are unfamiliar. So not predetermined, but value. 
(Saussure 1993: 139a-140a)
According to Trask, Chinese lacks tense 
entirely and the African language Bamileke-
Dschang distinguishes 11 tenses (Trask 2007: 
294). Sampson also points out the same thing 
as this concerning "mood," quoting examples 
of French and English (Sampson 1980: 39). If 
Saussure is right, we cannot have what are 
called "pure concepts", which Chomsky thinks 
are innate as we shall see later, before we have 
acquired a language (langue). Languages are, 
for Saussure, a fait social (social fact). Moreover, 
Saussure insists that concepts separated from 
sounds are just an object of psychology, but not 
that of linguistics:
The same thing must be said as regards 
the mental side of the linguistic sign. If you 
consider the various concepts (love, see, house) 
in themselves, apart from their representation 
a representing sign, they are a series of 
psychological objects. In the psychological 
domain, you can say that it is a complex unit. 
The concept must be only the value of an acoustic 
image if it is to belong to the linguistic domain. 
Or else, if you bring it into the linguistic domain, 
it is an abstraction. (Saussure 1993: 79a)
Saussure's view leads to the denial of 
Chomsky's idea that we are born with concepts 
which are equivalent to Saussure's signifies 
(concepts) and are separated from signifiants 
(sounds). Then, why does Chomsky think that 
we are born with concepts? Next, we discuss 
Chomsky's view of concepts.
1.2. We are born with a list of pre-existing concepts
According to Chomsky, the properties of the 
Spanish words seguir, perseguir, and persuadir are 
very complicated:
Consider the words seguir ("follow") and 
perseguir ("chase"). The latter involves human 
intention. To chase someone is not merely to 
follow him; in facts, one may chase someone 
without exactly following his path, and one 
may be following someone's path precisely 
at a fixed distance from him without chasing 
him [ ] Rather, to chase someone is to follow 
him [ ] with a certain intention: the intention 
to keep on his trail and perhaps [...] to catch 
him. Similarly, the word persuadir ("persuade") 
involves the notion of causation as well as the 
notion of intention or decision [...]. To persuade 
John to go to college is to cause John to decide 
or intend to go to college; if John at no point 
decides or intends to go to college, then I have 
not persuaded him to go to college, however 
much I may have tried. The situation is in fact 
a good bit more complex. I may cause John to 
decide to go to college by force or threat, but 
without having persuaded him to go to college, 
strictly speaking. Persuasion involves volition. If 
I say that the police interrogator persuaded John 
to confess by the threat of torture, I am using the 
term "persuade" ironically. (Chomsky 1988: 31-
32)
In spite of these facts, children can learn the 
words perfectly right away. This means that 
they are born with a long list of concepts, which 
correspond to the words prior to any experience. 
Then they learn the labels that go with the pre-
existing concepts. Chomsky insists that this is 
the way children acquire their vocabulary. So, 
if Chomsky is right, it does not follow that we 
have nothing like "pure concepts" in advance 
of a langue as Saussure insists. But on the other 
hand, Chomsky does not deny that "words may 
not match precisely across languages (Chomsky 
1988: 32)" just as Saussure has already pointed 
out above. In other words, he accepts the 
possibility of modification of the conceptual 
framework "by experience and varying cultural 
contexts (Chomsky 1988: 32)", but nevertheless 
he insists that the framework is a common 
human property:
[...] it is beyond question that acquisition of 
vocabulary is guided by a rich and invariant 
conceptual system, which is prior to any 
experience. (Chomsky 1988: 32) 
So, for Chomsky language is a matter of 
biology, but not a matter of society as Saussure 
insists. Incidentally, Chomsky thinks that we 
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are born with Universal Grammar (henceforth 
UG) with parameters. Then, as we are exposed 
to a language spoken around us, the parameters 
are set one way or another and we acquire 
a particular language. Chomsky calls this 
language an internalized language (I-language).
The language may be English or Japanese 
or whatever, depending on the circumstances 
under which we are living. Can't we apply this 
idea to acquisition of vocabulary? Suppose 
we are equipped with UG of concepts and 
sounds of words. This UG has parameters both 
for concepts and for sounds each. As we are 
exposed to words of a language, the parameters 
are set one way or another and we acquire a 
sys¬tem of concepts and sounds of the language. 
Chom¬sky has not proposed such an idea but 
he implies that we may have UG of morals 
(Chomsky 1988: 152153), the arts (Chomsky 
1980: 252; 1988: 152), mathematics (Chomsky 
1980: 249), face-recognition (Chomsky 1980: 248-
249), and science-forming capacity (Chomsky 
1980: 251-252; 1988: 156-159). So it is thought 
that he is likely to accept the speculation above. 
If this hypothesis is assumed to be correct, we 
can explain both why children can learn words 
so fast and accurately and why every human 
language has its own unique, distinct system 
of concepts and sounds. Can this idea reconcile 
Saussure's thought that a langue determines its 
sounds and concepts with Chomsky's that we 
are equipped with concepts at birth?
2. How do phonemes appear?
2.1. We are born with phonemes
According to Chomsky, we are born with 
phonemes:
Consider, for example, the words listed below, 
where column I is the conventional orthography, 
column II appears
I  II  III
bet  bet  bet
bent  bent  bet
bend bend  bend
knot  nat  nat
nod  nad  nAd
write rayt  rayt
ride  rayd  rAyd
writer rayt+r  rayDr
rider rayd+r  rAyDr 
to be the correct phonological representation, 
and column III, the approximate phonetic 
representations in one dialect of English, [...] 
The representations of column II are essentially 
the mental representations of the lexicon, 
which enter into the syntax and semantics. 
The phonetic representations of column III 
derive from these by straightforward rules, 
most of them quite general: Vowels assume a 
particular quality before voiced and unvoiced 
consonants and become nasalized before nasal 
consonants, the nasal consonant drops before 
an unvoiced dental, and (in this dialect) the 
dental stops merge as [D] medially under 
this stress contour. Applying these rules, we 
derive the phonetic forms (III) from the lexical-
pho-nological representations (II). The latter 
representations are not derived from the speech 
sounds by analytic procedures of segmentation, 
classification, extraction of physical features, 
and so forth, but are established and justified as 
part of the best theory for accounting ultimately 
for the general relation between sound and 
meaning of the I-language. Further syntactic 
and semantic rules apply to the representations 
of (II) in the expressions in which these words 
appear. The I-language, incorporating the rules 
that form the representations (II) and the rules 
that relate them to (III), is acquired by the child 
by applying the principles incorporated in the 
initial state So [UG] to the presented facts; the 
problem for the grammarian is to discover these 
principles and show how they lead to the choice 
of the representations (II) [...]. (Chomsky 1986: 
41-43)
Here Chomsky thinks that phonemes are 
innate. He says that the representations of column 
II (which is thought to be the phonological 
representation) are essentially the mental 
representations of the lexicon, from which the 
phonetic representations of column III derive. In 
other words, he thinks that the phonetic forms 
(III) are derived from the lexical-phonological 
representations (II). Moreover, he goes on to say, 
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"the I-language, incorporating the rules that form 
the representations (II) and the rules that relate 
them to (III), is acquired by the child by applying 
the principles incorporated in the initial state So 
[UG] to the presented facts". So for Chomsky, 
the problem for the grammarian is to discover 
these principles (which are incorporated in the 
initial state So [UG]) and show how they lead to 
the choice of the representations (II). Chomsky's 
explanation could be interpreted as follows:
Column II is the mental representations of the
lexicon, from which the physical 
representations of column III derive. This means 
that (III) is developed from (II). How is column 
II acquired? Children are born with UG, which 
incorporates principles, and then they are 
exposed to the presented facts and they acquire 
the I-language, which incorporates both the 
rules that form the representations (II) and the 
rules that relate them to (III). So the acquisition 
of the representations of (II) is a matter of 
choice for Chomsky. It depends on what kinds 
of presented facts children are exposed to that 
they acquire what kinds of representation (II). In 
short, children ac-quire phonemes based on UG. 
After all Chomsky insists that we have phonemes 
and rules in advance, then we produce sounds 
of words, using the phonemes and applying the 
rules to them. For Chomsky, phonemes exist 
independently of concepts, which Saussure 
thinks are closely linked with sounds.
2.2. Phonemes appear after a langue divides the 
masses of concept and sound
According to Saussure we have signes after 
both the mass of concept and the mass of sound 
are divided by a langue at the same time. If 
something like "pure phonemes" existed in 
advance before signes appear, what would 
happen? Phonemes across all the languages 
would probably correspond to one another, even 
if in part. But they actually don't. For example, in 
English a phoneme /p/ can be pronounced [ph] 
or [p] as an allophone. But Mandarin Chinese 
has two different words pronounced [pha] and 
[pa] respectively. These two sounds [ph] and [p] 
belong to two clearly different phonemes /ph/ 
and /p/. So Mandarin Chinese has two phonemes 
/ph/ and /p/ (Trask 2007: 214). This means that 
one phoneme /p/ in English is treated as two 
phonemes /ph/ and /p/ in Mandarin Chinese. 
Sampson also points out the same thing as this, 
quoting two examples: one is one phoneme for 
English and two phonemes for Russian, and 
the other is one phoneme for Japanese and two 
phonemes for English. (Sampson 1980: 38-39). So 
if this is true, something like "pure phonemes", 
which Chomsky thinks are innate, does not exist 
in advance:
The precautions to be taken are various, 
in accordance with the actual nature of the 
linguistic object. The first condition to be 
satisfied for identifying a linguistic entity is 
that the association between the two elements 
[the concept and the acoustic image] should be 
present and maintained. If we unwittingly take 
only one of the elements, one of the parts, we 
have straight away created a spurious linguistic 
unit. We have made an abstraction and it is no 
longer the concrete object that we have before 
us. One must not dissociate what is associated in 
the linguistic sign. (Saussure 1993: 79a)
Saussure insists that sounds fall within 
linguistics only when they are considered as the 
material basis for the concepts:
It constantly happens that in reality you take 
just one part of the linguistic sign even when 
you think you are dealing with the whole, and 
then you are no longer dealing with linguistic 
entities. Thus if we take the material side, the 
sequence of sounds, it will be linguistic only 
if considered as the material basis for the idea; 
but envisaged in itself (the material side) it is 
a substance which is not linguistic, substance 
which can only be relevant to the study of 
speech, if the envelope of the word represents 
a substance which is not linguistic. A language 
we do not know is not linguistic as far as we are 
concerned. From that point of view, you can say 
that the material word is an abstraction from the 
linguistic point of view. As a concrete object, it is 
not part of linguistics. (Saussure 1993: 79a)
Similarly, for Saussure, both sounds and 
concepts are closely linked together, so neither 
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sounds separated from concepts nor concepts 
separated from sounds are the object of linguistics, 
but that of phonetics or psychology respectively. 
For Chomsky, we are born with concepts and 
phonemes and find out sounds which are to be 
combined with the concepts. Then we produce 
the sounds, using the phonemes and applying 
rules, which are innate, to them. According 
to Saussure, neither concepts separated from 
sounds, nor sounds separated from concepts are 
objects of linguistics and do exist in advance of 
a langue in itself. In this respect, Saussure and 
Chomsky are sharply opposed to each other. 
By the way, Sampson is skeptical of the reality 
of phonemes, quoting an example of Mandarin 
Chinese (Sampson 1980: 70-74). He says that the 
phoneme theory is just a statistical tendency.
3. How do languages change?
3.1. Parole changes langue
Saussure says that it is parole that changes a 
langue:
But changes always begin with facts of speech 
[parole]. [...] Every evolution, every evolutionary 
fact in a language [langue] begins with a fact of 
speech. [...] The cause of evolutionary linguistic 
facts lies in facts of speech. [...] But at the same 
time, it will be seen that the facts of speech 
where an innovation is tried out are always 
individual. Why in German did people come 
to say ich war -wir waren instead of ich was- wir 
waren (as in English I was: we were)? Because a 
few individuals began to say ich war by analogy. 
It was only a fact of speech [parole] and not a fact 
of the language [langue] as long as there were 
only a few individuals who did it. (Saussure 
1993: 118a-119a)
Thus, it is not until a society accepts parole 
that parole has become a part of a langue. So it 
follows that a langue does not precede parole, but 
that parole causes historical changes of a langue. 
Moreover, the changes are caused by "analogy".
3.2. Historical changes of languages are consequences 
of re-settings of parameters
On the other hand, Chomsky insists that 
historical changes of an E-language (externalized 
language), which is equivalent to parole in 
Saussure's framework, are caused by re-settings 
of parameters of UG:
In Spanish, for example, there are such 
constructions as
(23)
a. Llega.
    Arrives.
   "He/she/it arrives".
b. Llega Juan.
    Arrives Juan.
   "Juan arrives".
[...] The same is true of Italian and other 
Romance languages. But in French the 
corresponding forms are impossible. The subject 
must be explicitly expressed throughout, and 
it cannot follow the verb as in (23b) [...] These 
differences between French and the other 
Romance languages developed only a few 
centuries ago and apparently at about the same 
time. It is likely that they are consequences of a 
change in a single parameter, perhaps influenced 
by the example of the nearby Germanic 
languages. [...] Some progress has been made in 
reducing these consequences to what is called the 
null subject parameter, which determines whether 
the subject of a clause can be suppressed, as in 
(23a), [...] (Chomsky 1988: 63-64)
As we have seen, Chomsky thinks that 
historical changes of an E-language are caused by 
re-settings of parameters of UG while Saussure 
insists that changes of parole, which is equivalent 
to an E-language, cause those of a langue, which 
is thought to be equivalent to an I-language. Here 
the point may be the interpretation of Saussure's 
idea of "langue". Saussure asks why people say in 
German, "ich war -wir waren", but not "ich was -wir 
waren" as in English "I was- we were". He answers, 
"Because a few individuals began to say ich war 
by analogy". So here Saussure treats with the 
change of vocabulary, in this case, from "was" to 
"war", but not the change of word order as in the 
case of French illustrated by Chomsky. It may 
be the logical necessity that Saussure's example 
of change of language is limited to vocabulary 
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because his langue excludes sentences from its 
domain as we shall see later. On the other hand, 
for Chomsky the change of language means that of 
word order because his parameters of UG are not 
thought to be involved in vocabulary at all. So the 
difference between Saussure and Chomsky on the 
changes of language may not be discussed in the 
same way. For Saussure a langue is an inventory 
of words while for Chomsky an I-language is the 
con-sequences of UG with parameters set in a 
particular manner. So changes of a langue are, for 
Saussure, changes of vocabulary whereas changes 
of an I-language are, for Chomsky, changes 
of parameters of UG because an I-language is 
consequences of UG after parameters are set 
in a particular way. So it seems that these two 
theories are not compatible with each other. But if 
Saussure's theory is interpreted as the following: 
parole changes the values of parameters of UG, 
and then a langue also changes, this interpretation 
may coincide with Chomsky's theory quite well. 
After all, do Saussure and Chomsky explain the 
same phenomena in a different way?
4. Where does syntax belong to?
4.1. Syntax belongs to parole
According to Saussure, valeurs (values) of 
words are realized by the opposition or difference 
between words. This opposition or difference 
is developed in two domains, one of which is 
called a syntagmatic relation (a syntagma):
The value (valeur) of a word at any given 
moment exists only in relation to other similar 
units. The relation and the difference between 
words has its basis in two dimensions, two quite 
separate domains: each of these generates a 
certain kind of value and the contrast between 
the two itself throws light on each. We are 
dealing with two domains or two ways of 
connecting words with one another. There is 
1) syntagmatic coordination and the domain 
of syntagmatic relations. [...] This combination 
giving rise to certain relations may be called a 
syntagma. It is the combination of two or several 
units, all present and consecutive. If they formed 
a sequence with no connexion between them, 
I would not call them a syntagma, but several 
consecutive units with a connexion between 
them or with the whole form a syntagma. 
(Saussure 1993: 128a-129a)
As "the combination of two or several units", 
for example, we have a German word Hauptmann, 
a German compound word Dummheit, a Latin 
word magnanimus (and animus as well), and a 
French fixed expression (cliché) s'il vows plait 
in each langue. Then do sentences, which are 
combinations of words called syntagmas, belong 
to a langue? Saussure answers this question:
Syntagmas, although they are to be seen in 
combinations that are not sentences, clearly 
include sentences themselves as types. Every 
sentence will be a syntagma. Now the sentence 
belongs to speech [parole] and not to the language 
[langue]. (Saussure 1993: 131a)
Furthermore, Saussure explains why sentences 
belong to parole and not to a langue:
[...] there is always that individual element, the 
combination which is left for everyone to choose in 
order to express their own thought in a sentence. 
This combination belongs to speech [parole], for it 
is an execution. (Saussure 1993: 73a)
Thus, Saussure cannot help admitting that a 
syntagmatic relation (a syntagma) belongs both 
to a langue and to parole:
That part (second individual use of the 
language code) raises a question. It is only 
ultimately in syntax that there is a certain 
vagueness about what is given in the language 
[langue] and what is left to individual initiative. 
The delimitation is difficult to establish. It must 
be admitted that here in the domain of syntax 
the social element [langue] and the individual 
element [parole], execution and fixed association, 
are somewhat intermingled, get more or less in-
termingled. (Saussure 1993: 73a)
4.2. Syntax belongs to I-language
According to Chomsky, we have "notion 
of structure" in our mind, which he calls an 
"internalized language (I-language)":
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[...] Otto Jespersen, who held that there is some 
"notion of structure" in the mind of the speaker 
"which is definite enough to guide him in 
framing sentences of his own," in particular, "free 
expressions" that may be new to the speaker and 
to others. Let us refer to this "notion of structure" 
as an "internalized language" (I-language). The 
I-language, then, is some element of the mind of 
the person who knows the language, acquired 
by the learner, and used by the speaker-hearer. 
(Chomsky 1986: 21-22)
We acquire an I-language after parameters of 
UG are set one way or another, depending on 
the language spoken around us. Moreover, this 
UG has certain categories of lexical items:
Universal grammar permits certain categories 
of lexical items, basically four: verbs (V), 
nouns (N), adjectives (A), and adpositions 
(P; prepositions or postpositions, depending 
on whether they precede or follow their 
complements). [...] For each of these basic 
categories, universal grammar provides a 
projection of which it is the head: verb phrase 
(VP), noun phrase (NP), adjective phrase (AP), 
adpositional phrase (PP). (Chomsky 1988: 68)
Each projection is composed of a head 
and a complement. Chomsky thinks that it is 
determined by a parameter of UG called a head-
parameter whether a head precedes or follows a 
complement. For example, in Spanish, the value 
of the head-parameter is "head first," which 
means heads precede complements in the four 
projections:
a. VP: hablar inglés
   "speak English"
b. NP: traducción del libro
   translation of-the book
   "translation of the book"
c. AP: lleno de agua
   "full of water"
d. PP: a Juan
   "to Juan"  (Chomsky 1988: 68)
The same is true of English too. But in Miskito 
and Japanese, the value of the head-parameter 
is "head last," which means heads follow 
complements in the four projections. Chomsky's 
explanation seems to be perfect but there are 
some languages whose word order cannot be 
explained using the head-parameter of UG:
There are possibilities of word order permitted 
by universal grammar that go beyond those I 
have illustrated. The languages mentioned so 
far observe the condition that the elements of 
a phrase are adjacent, [...] But some languages 
do not observe this condition of adjacency in 
the underlying abstract structure. Phrases may 
be genuinely "scattered", though there is good 
reason to believe that the phrases do exist and are 
determined by the same general principles with 
other forms of association replacing adjacency. 
(Chomsky 1988: 73)
Thus, Chomsky manages to solve the problem 
of word order based on the head-parameter 
of UG. On the other hand, Saussure thinks 
that sentences, which appear as a syntagmatic 
relation, belong to parole, but not to a langue. So 
word order, such "head first" or "head last" as 
Chomsky insists, does not belong to a langue. 
This means that Chomsky's assertion is not 
the subject matter of linguistics for Saussure. 
"Notion of structure," which Jespersen thinks 
is necessary in making sentences of "free 
expressions," belongs to parole according to 
Saussure. Thus syntax, which is the main theme 
for Chomsky, belongs to parole for Saussure. 
Should Saussure have limited syntagmatic 
relations to parole? Why does not Saussure think 
that sentences belong to a langue? The number 
of sentences is infinite So if we suppose that 
sentences belong to a langue, then it follows that 
in a langue we have all the sentences we make 
in prior to actual utterances. This means that 
we derive the suitable ready-made sentences 
from a langue. This comes to mean that uttering 
sentences is not a creative activity. Saussure 
might have wanted to avoid such a conclusion. 
Sampson says almost the same thing as this 
(Sampson 1980: 54). On the other hand, Chomsky 
seeks formal universality, admitting the infinity 
of linguistic expressions. He assumes UG to be 
innate in human beings because children can 
acquire a complexly structured language easily 
and quickly without being taught anything. His 
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head-parameter is postulated as a mechanism to 
enable various human languages to be derived 
from UG. But actually even in English, which 
has a relatively fixed word order, an object 
could be moved before a verb: This paper I 
have written. Is Chomsky really right? Is word 
order determined by a parameter of UG? As 
we have seen, Saussure regards sentences as an 
individual execution while Chomsky insists that 
word order is biologically determined by the 
value of the head-parameter of UG. After all, the 
question of where sentences belong to may be 
a matter of what a langue or I-language is. For 
Saussure, a langue is an inventory of words so it 
follows that sentences belong to parole, but not 
to a langue. On the other hand, for Chomsky, 
an I-language is consequences of parameter-
setting of UG, so sentences, in this case, types 
of word order, belong to an I-language, but not 
to an E-language. Their difference concerning 
sentences may come from that between a langue 
and an I-language.
5. Is language social or biological?
5.1. Langue is a social fact (fait social)
According to Saussure, a langue exists as what 
is socially approved by members of a 
community. It is located in brains of members 
of a community just like a dictionary. Moreover, 
a langue exists as if it were outside of the will of 
members of a community: 
Developing and fixing this product [langue] is 
the work of the collective intelligence. Everything 
that is the language [langue] is implicitly collective.
Whereas there is no collective speech [parole]. 
To say that a word has come into the language 
[langue] is to say that it has received collective 
approval. Acts of speech [parole] remain individual, 
apart from being momentary. Crowd gathered 
in a market square; in what way is the language 
[langue] present in this crowd? In the form of a 
deposit existing in brain of each of the persons 
making up the crowd like a dictionary of which 
all the copies were distributed to these persons. 
This thing, although internal to each individual, 
is at the same time collective, lying beyond the 
will of the individual. 1 + 1 + 1 = 1 (collective 
model). (Saussure 1993: 91a)
A langue is what is acquired but not an ability 
endowed by nature:
[...] The language faculty, it will be said, 
appears to us as a faculty given to us by nature, 
whereas the language [langue], on the contrary, is 
something that is acquired and conventional. It 
cannot take precedence over natural phenomena, 
natural instincts. (Saussure 1993: 66a)
Furthermore, Saussure compares a langue to 
work of music:
The language [langue] is comparable to work 
of music. A musical work exists only in virtue 
of the total number of performances of it. The 
performances are something quite apart from the 
work. A symphony is a reality that exists without 
any performance. Similarly, the renderings in 
speech [parole] of what is given in the language 
[langue] may seem inessential. (Saussure 1993: 
72a)
As we have seen, langue is a social fact for 
Saussure.
5.2. I-language is biological
According to Chomsky, on the other hand, 
I-language is mental states and representations 
of the mind/brains, which is physically encoded 
in some manner. Moreover, I-language is the 
human biological endowment, so linguistics is 
ultimately part of biology:
[...], the steady state of knowledge attained 
[I-language] and the initial state So [UG] are real 
ele¬ments of particular mind/brains, aspects 
of the physical world, where we understand 
mental states and representations to be physically 
encoded in some manner. [...] Linguistics, 
conceived as the study of I-language and So [UG], 
becomes part of psychology, ultimately biology. 
(Chomsky 1986: 26-27)
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For Chomsky, an I-language exists in the brain 
of a single individual, even though there are not 
any other people. But for Saussure, a langue does 
not exist as a perfect thing in a single individual 
as Chomsky asserts. It is not until there are 
many individuals who consist of a society that a 
langue does exist. For Chomsky, an I-language is 
physical but for Saussure, a langue exists outside 
of an individual's will. Chomsky insists that an 
I-language, which is acquired after parameters 
of UG are set one way or another, is innate 
and endowed by nature whereas Saussure 
thinks that a langue is what is learned. In this 
respect, Chomsky's I-language is biological 
but Saussure's langue is social. Saussure says 
that a langue exists without the execution of 
parole just as work of music does without being 
performed. Similarly, Chomsky thinks that the 
essence of chess is not the moves of its pieces but 
its rules (Chomsky 1986: 27). This means that 
the essence of language is not utterances made 
in everyday life (E-language) but what enables 
such utterances (I-language). As we have seen, 
Saussure and Chomsky agree that the essence 
of language is language rules which intervene 
between cognition and expression, whether a 
language is thought to be social or biological. 
But if language rules are, as Miura points out 
(Miura 1967: 149-199), "conceptually objectified 
will" which intervenes between cognition and 
expression in process structure of language: 
object cognition-' expression, it is thought that 
Chomsky reduces language rules to physical 
things and Saussure thinks of them as something 
like a dictionary. Why does Saussure think that a 
langue is social (a fait social)? Why does Chomsky 
think that an I-language is biological? It may be 
because Saussure's langue is based on the social 
contract and Chomsky's I-language is derived 
from UG, which is biologically determined in 
genes.
6. What are parts of speech?
6.1. Parts of speech are innate and physically 
encoded in the mind/brains
Chomsky's UG has four categories of lexical 
items:
Universal grammar permits certain categories 
of lexical items, basically four: verbs (V), 
nouns (N), adjectives (A), and adpositions 
(P; prepositions or postpositions, depending 
on whether they precede or follow their 
complements). [...] The basic elements of the 
lexicon fall within these four categories, [...] 
(Chomsky 1988: 68)
We acquire various I-languages (human lan-
guages) after the values of the parameters of UG 
are set one way or another. So it is thought that 
four categories: verbs (V), nouns (N), adjectives 
(A), and adpositions (P) are innate, common and 
universal across all the human languages.
6.2. Parts of speech are not a linguistic reality
On the other hand, for Saussure the 
classification of parts of speech is not a 
grammatical reality:
In the French sentence ces gants sont bon 
marche ('these gloves are good value'), is bon 
marche (`good value') an adjective? Logically, it 
has the right meaning. But grammatically it is 
less clear. For bon marche does not behave like a 
normal French adjective: it is invariable, never 
precedes its noun, and so on. Furthermore, it 
consists of two words. What the parts of speech 
provide is a classification of individual words: 
so how can a group of two words belong to one 
or other of the parts of speech? Yet if we split 
it up into two words, and say bon (`good') is an 
adjective, whereas marche (`value' ) is a noun, we 
have not accounted for the single expression bon 
marche ('good value'). The conclusion is that our 
`parts of speech' classification must be defective 
or incomplete: its division of words into nouns, 
verbs, adjectives, etc. does not correspond to any 
undeniable linguistic reality. (Saussure 1983: 
108) 
The same thing may be true of a piece of cake in 
the English sentence "The question is a piece of cake". 
Is it an adjective? It never has the comparative or 
superlative degree. Furthermore, it consists of 
four words. So how can a group of four words 
belong to one or other of the parts of speech? 
Yet if we split it up into four words, and say a 
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is an article, piece a noun, of a preposition, and 
cake a noun, we have not accounted for the single 
expression a piece of cake. Chomsky is sharply 
opposed to Saussure in regard to classification 
of parts of speech. For Chomsky, parts of speech 
are physical and biologically encoded in genes, 
but for Saussure, they are not grammatical reality 
but what is logical (we mistake parts of speech 
for what is grammatical). Are parts of speech 
innate or just logical artifacts? It is unlikely 
that Saussure would accept Chomsky's reality 
of parts of speech because he thinks that parts 
of speech are logic and imposed on grammar. 
After all, for Saussure, a langue is concerned with 
only words (signes). So parts of speech are not 
involved in a langue but in logic as he suggests. 
On the other hand, for Chomsky, an I-language 
is concerned with word order, or syntax. So the 
distinction of "parts of speech" is closely linked 
with an I-language because the distinction of 
"parts of speech" is indispensable to word order, 
or syntax. So their difference in regard to "parts 
of speech" is due to that between their key 
concept of language: langue and I-language.
7. Is langue or I-language delimited?
7. 1. I-language is delimited
According to Chomsky, the term "language" 
involves obscure sociopolitical factors:
We speak of Chinese as a language, whereas 
Spanish, Catalan, Portuguese, Italian, and 
the other Romance languages are different 
languages. But the so-called dialects of Chinese 
are as varied as the Romance languages. We 
call Dutch a language and German a different 
language, but the variety of German spoken 
near the Dutch border can be understood by 
speakers of Dutch who live nearby, though not 
by speakers of German in more remote areas. 
(Chomsky 1988: 37)
So Chomsky asserts that the term "language" 
is not useful in linguistics because of its 
sociopolitical factors.
7.2. Langue is not delimited
On the other hand, according to Saussure, 
there are no boundaries between langues:
On the same principle by which languages 
[langues] are divided into dialects, there are no 
precise boundaries between languages [langues]. 
1) Supposing there were a uniform language 
[langue] A and an equally uniform language 
[langue] B, the presence of a transition zone 
would be surprising. But language [langue] A is 
an aggregate of dialects internally related, while 
language [langue] B is likewise an aggregate of 
dialects. Everything is transitional from one end 
of the area to the other. 2) In the schema I have 
just presented, I assumed dialects to be closed; 
but ultimately there are only dialects open on 
all sides, formed by the succession of waves in 
which they participate. We must not imagine 
there are boundaries between language [langue] 
A and language [langue] B. (Saussure 1993: 31a)
For Saussure, a langue is a continuum with no 
boundaries between langues. Chomsky insists 
that an I-language, which is acquired after the 
values of parameters of UG are set one way 
or another, is the object of linguistics because 
a language, which is called an E-language by 
Chomsky, has a vague sociopolitical factors. 
On the other hand, Saussure does not admit 
the boundaries of languages [langues] at all. 
But there are boundaries between I-languages 
because each I-language is the consequences of a 
particular parameter-setting of UG. I-languages 
are different from one another in the values of 
parameters. But langues have no boundaries 
between themselves. So is it impossible that 
Chomsky's I-language and Saussure's langue can 
be reconciled? When Chomsky asserts that the 
term "language" involves obscure sociopolitical 
factors, he refers to E-language as language. So 
for Chomsky, I-language does not involve any 
obscure sociopolitical factors at all, but it is a 
clear and scientific object of linguistics. On the 
other hand, for Saussure, there are no boundaries 
between langues. So it follows that there are no 
boundaries whatever between paroles, which 
are nothing but executions of langues. That is to 
say, for Saussure, there are no boundaries both 
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between langues and between paroles. Saussure 
and Chomsky agree that the term "language" 
(E-language) involves obscure sociopolitical 
factors and there are no boundaries between 
paroles, which are execution of langues. But they do 
not agree that an I-language is a delimited entity 
defined by the values of parameters of UG but 
that there are no boundaries whatever between 
langues, which are thought to be equivalent to 
I-languages in Chomsky's framework. After all, 
can't we reconcile these two theses: 1) Saussure's 
thesis that there are no boundaries at all between 
langues; and 2) Chomsky's thesis that I-languages 
are delimited entities, which can be studied in 
the scientific framework as in other domains of 
natural sciences? For Saussure, a langue is, after 
all, the consequences of how the world, which 
is a continuum according to him, is split into a 
certain pattern, which is a langue itself. So there 
could be overlaps between langues, which are not 
the same as one another. That's why Saussure 
says that there is no boundaries between langues. 
On the other hand, for Chomsky, E-languages, 
considered as something social, do not have 
any inherent boundaries between themselves as 
Saussure asserts, but I-languages, considered as 
consequences of parameter-settings of UG, have 
a definite boundaries between themselves. This 
difference may be also based on that of their 
views of language: langue and I-language.
Conclusion
We have considered Saussure's and Chomsky's 
views of languages. What underlies their 
differences is their fundamental idea of languages. 
Saussure insists that languages are a social 
fact while Chomsky asserts that languages are 
biological. Their different views of language 
come from these basic standpoints. Although 
Saussure and Chomsky have had a great impact 
on linguistics and other fields of sciences as 
well, their thoughts on language have never 
been unified into one grand theory so far, just as 
the theory of relativity and the quantum theory 
have not. Will these two thoughts be reconciled 
some day? Or will one of the two give way to the 
other?
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